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Critical Requirements of a System 
of Internal Accounting Control 
Robert J. Sack 
Touche Ross & Co. 
This paper will review those requirements of a system of internal control 
which can be considered to be "critical." First, it will be important to define and 
clarify some terms, and establish a context for the discussion in the paper. The 
body of the paper will review a series of critical requirements, considering first the 
required-elements of a system and then considering the required characteristics of 
a system. And finally, the paper will explore the possibility that leadership is the 
most critical element of any internal control system. 
Definitions and Context 
Before beginning an analysis of the critical requirements of a system, it is im-
portant to ask, "critical for what purpose?" In fact, that question can be asked in 
a number of ways: We can ask what requirements are critical for the preparation 
of accurate financial statements, intended for public reliance. Or we can ask what 
requirements are critical for the preservation and protection of the entity's assets. 
Or we can ask what requirements are critical to the development of operating and 
analytical data, necessary for the running of the business. A system that is de-
signed to assure reliable operating data will function at a level of detail, and with 
such breadth as to assure the protection of assets, and the development of ac-
curate, public financial statements. Because that is the broadest objective, that will 
be the context of this paper. 
By establishing that broad objective, we will also be saying that we expect the 
system to control errors at a fairly low level of materiality. Because the system 
must provide accurate information for operating decisions, materiality will be 
measured against the cost of a wrong decision. Because decisions are ongoing, a 
wrong decision can have a multiplying effect, and the measure of materiality—the 
tolerance of the system—must be quite low. Conversely, if we had said that the 
objective of the system was to preserve the entity's assets, the standards of the 
system—the materiality of the losses it is designed to control—could be relatively 
easier. The assets of the entity may be quite valuable, but it is usually more effec-
tive to insure against the loss of an asset, rather than to design a system which will 
provide comprehensive protection against its loss. Or, if we had said that the ob-
jective of the system was to produce accurate financial statements for public con-
sumption, the standards applied to the system—the measure of materiality 
required—might have been even less stringent. Published financial statements 
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present a macro view of the entity, summarizing a host of individual transactions. 
If our objective was only to produce accurate published statements, it would be 
wasteful to establish a system which controlled to a level of materiality greater 
than that which would impact the statements themselves. 
The fact that there might be different standards and different measures of 
materiality for different objectives of a system seems clear, upon reflection. Still, 
we stumble over the idea that published financial statements might not be subject 
to a first level system of controls. That anomaly is one cause of the continuing 
conflict over the SEC's proposal to require public reporting on internal control 
systems. Careful research into this materiality question would be helpful to all of 
those who work with systems, at the various levels—corporate executives, inter-
nal auditors, and external auditors. 
Also, when we talk about a system of internal control, it is important to 
understand how the word "system" is used. For purposes of this discussion, the 
word "system'' must mean all elements of the company which are directed to the 
gathering and presentation of operating and analytical data—the objective of the 
system which we described at the outset. Let us be clear that we mean all of the 
quantitative factors which are normally ascribed to a "system," including policies 
and procedures, or tests and checks. But also the "system" must be understood 
to include qualitative factors characteristic of the entity, including its ethical code 
and its business atmosphere. 
Because this discussion is directed to a "system," it should be understood 
that the discussion is directed to an entity of some size. Typically, the smaller en-
tities find it impossible or impractical to employ the usual quantitative elements of 
a system and so they must rely on the qualitative elements for their internal con-
trols. The unique internal control problems of the smaller entities warrant an en-
tirely separate discussion. The discussion in this paper will assume that the system 
we are analyzing operates in an entity of enough size to justify both quantitative 
and qualitative aspects. 
The body of this paper will discuss the elements and the characteristics of a 
system as individual factors. In an analysis of the critical aspects of a system, it is 
necessary to review the system in pieces. However, it should be understood that 
the pieces do not operate individually, but function as a system of internal control. 
We will presume that all of the elements of the system work together in a coor-
dinated way, with proper balance. Coordination and unification may be one of the 
most critical requirements of a system of internal control. But that requirement 
may be presumed in an analysis of the individual factors which make up the total, 
and the search for critical requirements must go deeper into the system's compo-
nent parts. 
T h e Critical Elements of a System of Internal Control 
There are two ways to approach an inquiry into the critical requirements of a 
system of internal control. One approach is to ask what elements are required. 
A n d this next section will review the elements of a system which can be con-
sidered to be critical to the system overall. 
Checks and Balances One of the most critical elements of a system of internal 
control is a requirement that no one individual has complete jurisdiction over an 
accounting transaction. Typically, we say that the cashier must not have access to 
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the accounts receivable records, lest he be given the opportunity to kite remit-
tances. But also, checks and balances are important in a broader sense. It is impor-
tant that a second perspective be brought to all accounting entries, including those 
which might not have a direct cash effect. For example, monthly journal entries 
ought to be reviewed and approved by someone independent of the preparer. That 
independent check is important not because the preparer might be tempted to 
manipulate an entry for his own advantage, but because the preparer cannot be ex-
pected to independently challenge his own work. 
In the same way that a system of checks and balances is critical for the system 
of internal control overall, a clear line of responsibility is critical for the successful 
operation of the checks and balances. It is of course important that the lines of 
responsibility within the entity be clearly understood and maintained. But more 
fundamentally, the responsibility lines must be challenged to be sure that they are 
logical and not just traditional. It has been traditional to have the internal audit 
department report directly to the entity's top financial officer. However, to 
preserve the effectiveness of the internal audit function as a corporate balance 
wheel, it is more logical to make the internal audit department responsible directly 
to the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors. 
Policies and Procedures Written policies and procedures are critical to the suc-
cess of the system because they establish a consistent response, determined in ad-
vance, apart from the heat of the moment. Comprehensive, written policies and 
procedures promote the efficiency of the system, of course. But more importantly, 
they reduce the possibility of an ad hoc response to a problem, and they therefore 
reduce the possibility of management override. 
The accounts receivable control clerk knows that he is responsible to reconcile 
the details of the customer accounts with the receivable control account. Written 
procedures tell him where he is to find the reconciling data, and they also tell 
others in the organization that he is entitled to have that data. But to have real 
payoff, the policies and procedures describing his job must tell him what he is to 
do, and who he is to contact when he encounters unusual, or unreconcilable 
items. His instructions should be sufficiently specific so that he will not be 
dissuaded from a vigorous pursuit of problems he encounters in the reconciliation 
process. 
The written policies and procedures should establish the parameters of the 
system. The written procedures must establish who is authorized to enter into or 
approve transactions. And the operating procedures must set the limits of those 
authorizations. For example, if the accounts payable clerk is to monitor the enti-
ty's disbursements—to be sure that the entity pays only for what it ordered—he 
must understand: 
1. How large a commitment the purchasing agent is entitled to make; 
2. How much of an overshipment, beyond the amount ordered by the 
purchasing agent, the disbursement agent is entitled to approve; and 
3. What he must do with the transaction that exceeds those limits. 
Incidentally, the disbursing/purchasing agent example here provides an illustra-
tion of the need for a logical reporting relationship, and an opportunity to depart 
from a traditional relationship. Traditionally, it might have been appropriate for 
the disbursing agent to review all overshipments with the purchasing agent, and 
abide by his approval of any excesses. However, a logical analysis of the transac-
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tion and the objective of the controls suggests that the disbursing agent ought to 
refer all excess shipments to the purchasing agent's superior—so as to preserve 
the integrity of the control which restricts the ability of the purchasing agent to 
commit the entity to transactions of a limited amount. 
Capable People The system must be operated by people who have the skills to 
do their job. There are some obvious skills which anyone participating in a system 
of control must have—including the ability to deal with forms and with numbers. 
But those skills may be presumed, and are not at issue here. More importantly, 
the people who operate the various aspects of the system must have the ability to 
understand the implications of their findings. The credit and collection people 
must understand the system enough to know what it means when the receivables 
of a division begin to show serious past-due problems. They must understand that 
a pattern of past-due receivables may be indicative of an economic problem in that 
division's region. But they must also understand that it may be indicative of ac-
count manipulation. 
In addition to having the ability to do their job, the people operating the 
system must have the time (and the other resources required) to do their job com-
pletely. Internal controls are most effective when they are exercised on a timely 
basis. The timely exercise of controls preserves the integrity of the system. And in 
some cases (particularly where the objective of the system is to assure accurate 
operating data) timely exercise of controls may be critical, in and of itself. For ex-
ample, the unit which is responsible for the preparation of customer invoices must 
be adequately staffed such that they are able to promptly account for the 
numerical sequence of shipping documents. Where that control is a vital step in 
assuring that all of the goods shipped are billed, it must be exercised on a timely 
basis: 
1. T o assure that the customer is invoiced promptly so that the entity's 
cash flow is maintained, 
2. To let the people in the shipping unit understand that their activities are 
subject to the oversight of an independent unit, 
3. T o assure that the records of finished goods, and the resultant 
production schedules are maintained accurately. 
A n d finally, the people operating the system must have a sense of personal integ-
rity. Personnel procedures should be designed to inquire into the background of 
individuals who are hired to run the system, and of course appropriate bonding 
contracts provide fall-back protection. To maintain that individual integrity, the 
overall system must be maintained. The environment of the system, the at-
mosphere of the entity, is the subject of the concluding section of this paper. 
Oversight and Supervision A l l of the elements described above presume a 
hierarchical structure which supervises the operation of the system. That supervi-
sion must be both apparent and real. The supervisory hierarchy ought not to be 
involved in the day to day affairs of their supervised units, but they should be in-
volved in the resolution of conflicts, and the follow-up on exceptions. To the ex-
tent that they do so, the involvement of the supervisory hierarchy in the system is 
real. But for the system to be effective on a long-term basis, that supervision must 
also be apparent. The supervision must follow up on exceptions promptly to keep 
the pipeline clean and to demonstrate the strength of the controls. Without that 
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supervisory follow-up, the system soon appears to be weak, and eventually 
becomes weak. 
A healthy system requires a balance between strong supervision and in-
dividual integrity. The individuals operating the system must understand that 
their operations are scrutinized: But they also must understand that there are 
limits to the authority of the supervision. They must feel confident of their posi-
tion so that they can maintain their own integrity, and the integrity of the system. 
There is something about that individual confidence which is within the individ-
ual himself: But that individual confidence can be enhanced by a comprehensive 
set of policies and procedures which describes the individual's position, establishes 
his authority, and spells out the role (and the limits) of the supervisor. 
T h e Critical Characteristics of a System of Internal Control 
As noted earlier, there are two ways to approach an inquiry into the critical re-
quirements of a system of internal control. The first approach, above, was to in-
quire into the elements of a system. A second approach is to ask what 
characteristics are required in a system. 
A Cost/Benefit Relationship A l l controls have benefits, and of course every 
control has a cost. One of the characteristics of a properly designed system of in-
ternal controls is that the cost/benefit relationship has been thoroughly thought 
out, and the tradeoffs carefully evaluated. To make that evaluation, the system 
planners must identify all of the costs of the proposed controls, and all of the 
benefits as well. For example, a department store's credit experience would benefit 
from a control that required specific approval of every credit card transaction. 
However, the cost in customer frustration would likely exceed the benefits ob-
tained. Therefore, most stores have established a floor limit, which allows the 
sales clerk to complete the sale without obtaining credit department approval so 
long as the transaction is below a designated dollar limit. 
Often, there are different levels of benefits which accompany a control. There 
are the obvious benefits which inspired the control in the first place. But on a sec-
ond level, the system as a whole may be enhanced by individual controls—the 
system as a whole may benefit from an atmosphere of control which flows from 
strengthened individual controls. And there may be benefits outside the entity, 
which will in turn benefit the entity. Stronger controls over purchasing (for in-
stance, a requirement to obtain a number of bids for purchases beyond a certain 
amount) may benefit the entity's suppliers and in turn may benefit the entity. If 
the suppliers are freed from the possibility of paying gratuities to the entity's pur-
chasing units, the supplier's prices may be lower and service more businesslike 
and straightforward. 
The passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1978, introduced a new 
element to the cost/benefit analysis. The Act talks only about controls and 
benefits, but does not deal with costs. Many critics of the Act have said that it is 
impractical because it does not explicitly deal with the cost/benefit question. 
However, one of the Congressmen who sponsored the Act answered those 
challenges in the following way: 
a. Congress understood the need for a cost/benefit relationship, and there 
was never any intention that an entity would have to control itself out of 
business. However, Congress was not prepared to legislate an analysis of 
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a cost/benefit tradeoff. Instead, they felt that it was more appropriate to 
let that tradeoff be analyzed in the courts. That approach is traditional 
for Congress—they reason that laws cannot be totally precise, and am-
biguities are to be settled on a case-by-case basis through the court 
system. Nonetheless, most business people are very uncomfortable with 
that traditional approach to a law which goes to the heart of their 
business. To the legislators it may be a traditional approach, but to the 
business people it appears cavalier. 
b. The sponsor of the bill has also cautioned business people to consider all 
of the benefits when they make their cost/benefit analysis. He observed 
that an entity must of course consider the benefits which accrue to it 
directly and indirectly. But also he suggested that an entity must con-
sider the benefits which accrue to society as a whole. He agreed that 
controls against bribery might not benefit an entity directly, and perhaps 
not even indirectly. However, he stated that Congress had concluded 
that society would benefit greatly from controls against bribery, and that 
the societal benefit ought to be included in each entity's cost/benefit 
equation. In the abstract, that notion is noble: In a specific situation, 
however, that idea makes a rational cost/benefit analysis almost impossi-
ble. 
Specific and Anticipatory A system of internal control should not be designed 
in the abstract but in the specific. The system should not be designed to establish 
specific controls, but it should be designed to control specific potential errors. The 
designers of the system (and those who are asked to evaluate the system) must ask 
themselves, "What could go wrong, and what controls will prevent those errors 
from getting out of hand?" That analysis requires a thorough understanding of 
the entity's objectives and the transactions to be controlled. 
The development of controls to deal with specific error types will of course 
proceed from experience. It will not be difficult to design controls to deal with er-
rors that have occurred before. It takes more imagination to anticipate problems 
that could occur, given a little twist on history. 
There are a number of tools which have proven to be helpful to this error/con-
trol analysis: 
1.The analysis might begin by developing a series of control questions 
suitable to each of the entity's business systems. For the payroll cycle, 
the control questions might ask—What controls assure that payroll cost 
is properly classified? What controls assure that individuals are paid 
only for time worked? What controls assure that payroll records are ac-
curate? 
2.Often, the analysis is enhanced when the entity's data flow is 
flowcharted. Good flowcharting procedures identify potential conflicts of 
interest and control omissions. 
3.The analysts should plan to spend a disproportionate amount of time 
and attention on the more exotic transactions. It is relatively easy to 
design a system which exercises control over purchasing of raw 
material. It is more difficult to design a system to control purchasing of 
fixed assets, because the transaction is usually one of a kind. It is even 
more difficult to design a system to control purchases of services, 
because of the intangible nature of the benefit received. 
Implementability The system will be operated by people and the system's 
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demands must not exceed their capabilities. Earlier, this paper argued that one of 
the critical elements of a system was that it be manned by capable people. To say 
that the system must be implementable is not to contradict that earlier 
requirement—nor is it redundant. Rather, to ask that the system be implemen-
table is to ask that it be practical. For example: 
1. The system should not ask the petty cash clerk to approve the 
President's travel expense report; 
2. The system should not ask a clerk to obtain his supervisor's approval for 
transactions in excess of $ 500 if the average transaction is $400; 
3. The system should not ask for the simultaneous participation of two 
people if manning tables provide for two people only during peak 
periods. 
Leadership Is T h e Critical Requirement 
A l l of the features of a system of internal control which we have discussed so 
far are important. However, the most critical requirement of any system is leader-
ship. With appropriate leadership, the most rudimentary of systems can function 
effectively. Without control-conscious leadership, the most tightly drawn system 
will fail. 
The leaders of the entity can affect the system in many ways. Most obviously, 
they affect the system in the way they allocate resources. Control systems cost 
money, and use valuable people. Even where a careful cost/benefit analysis ap-
parently justifies a control, the leadership of the entity may be hesitant. They may 
be reluctant to commit the resources because the payout is immediate while the 
benefit appears to be a longer term thing. Or they may be tempted to put their 
money where the return is more tangible. But, there is no free lunch; an under-
resourced control system carries a sure cost which must ultimately be paid. The 
investment in controls requires an element of vision and a sense of perspective. 
Also, the leaders of the entity affect the system in the way that they operate it. 
By definition, the leaders of the entity are in a position to make the system work 
or fail. Where the system calls for a cross check, or a follow-up, the leaders of the 
entity must allocate their attention to those duties. Careful attention to the control 
system by the subordinates will be for naught if the leadership fails to diligently 
play their role. 
Ultimately, the leadership of the company affects the control system most by 
the tone they set for the entity. A n Audit Committee, or a Board of Directors who 
tolerate unethical conduct in a corporate officer is inviting unethical conduct from 
other officers and employees as well. A n officer of an entity who winks at his own 
system is inviting his associates to do the same. Control is an attitude, and 
establishing an entity's attitudes is a prime responsibility of leadership. 
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